Agile approaches are sometimes focussed on helping organisations experience transformational change. Many Agile adoptions have failed to achieve long-term change, especially outside core teams, where the problems are non-routine and potentially embarrassing or threatening. Chris Argyris has developed a theory that provides a possible explanation of why Agile adoption has failed to bring about these hoped-for organisational changes.<\/p>\n
Argyris & Sch\u00f6n\u2019s Theory of Action<\/strong><\/p>\n Chris Argyris, a retired Harvard Professor, has spent his career developing ideas around Theory of Action (co-developed with Donald Sch\u00f6n) [1, 2]. The Theory of Action approach is based on the idea that we store programs in our heads which we use to determine action strategies (behaviours) that will achieve the consequences we desire in a way that is consistent with our governing values (preferred states we try to \u2018satisfice\u2019 when acting). Effective action is any action which produces an intended outcome that persists over time and achieves this without harming the current level of organisational performance.<\/p>\n Argyris and Sch\u00f6n believe there are two types of theories, those that we say we use (espoused theories), and those that we actually use (our ‘theories-in-use’). Espoused theories represent our ideals about effective action, whereas theories-in-use are used to produce real, concrete actions. We are often able to identify the gaps between what someone says and how they act, as the saying \u201cwatch what people do, not what they say\u201d illustrates. However, we are often blind to the fact our own actions aren\u2019t consistent with our espoused view of the world. If we are made aware of this gap, our usual reaction is to blame someone else or \u201cthe system\u201d<\/p>\n Model I and Skilled Incompetence<\/strong><\/p>\n Argyris and Sch\u00f6n have found that while there are differences between people’s espoused theories, there is very little difference in theories-in-use across cultures, age groups and gender (even after over 10,000 case studies). Argyris and Sch\u00f6n label this common theory-in-use \u201cModel I\u201d (other authors have describe it as \u201cclosed to learning\u201d or the \u201cunilateral control model\u201d). The governing variables of Model I are:<\/p>\n Based on these governing variables we choose action strategies such as advocating our own position, making evaluations of others\u2019 performance and their intentions in ways that ensure we remain in control, maximise our chance of winning whilst ensuring that we act diplomatically and ensure that no-one expresses negative feelings. We do this in ways that encourage neither inquiry into our views nor the robust testing of claims that we make, often relying on self-sealing logic such as \u201cTrust me; I know what I am doing\u201d [3].<\/p>\n When we are producing these actions, especially in non-routine situations which might be embarrassing or threatening, we are often blind to our own Model I behaviour. Worse, we actively try and by-pass the embarrassment or threat and then cover-up the bypass, leading to situations where we are unable to \u201cdiscuss the undiscussable\u201d. Using Model I means that we are likely to produce consequences we don’t intend. Model I behaviour is learnt over a lifetime and is produced skilfully, which makes it even harder to spot when we are producing it, leading to what Argyris labels \u201cSkilled Incompetence\u201d.<\/p>\n One way of detecting the gap between your own espoused theory and your theory-in-use is to use the \u201cLeft Hand Right Hand Case Study\u201d tool.\u00a0 Describe an actual or an imagined conversation with another person on a difficult topic.\u00a0\u00a0 On the right hand side, write the script of what was said. Ideally this would be a transcript of an audio recording, but a description of the conversation will also work. On the left hand side, write what you thought but did not say.\u00a0 Having done this, reflect on whether there was a gap between what you said and what you thought, but did not say.\u00a0 Argyris describes this gap as an ethical gap since it involves deliberately hiding information that may be useful to test, or share with others, without admitting that this is what is actually happening (it is covered-up and the cover-up is also covered-up).\u00a0 Argyris advocates striving to reduce the gap between what is on the left hand side and right hand side in a way that minimises the likelihood of all of those involved becoming defensive.<\/p>\n Individuals operating in a Model I fashion are likely to produce organisations full of defensive routines. Defensive routines are ways of acting that prevent us and others from threat or embarrassment, but also from learning. Common examples of defensive routines are mixed messages, such as \u201cI didn’t mean to interrupt you \u2026\u201d (clearly you did, and just have) or \u201cI don’t want to upset you, but \u2026\u201d or to say \u201cthat’s an interesting idea\u201d when there is no intent to act on it. Defensive routines make it harder for organisations to surface the information needed in order to learn.<\/p>\n Double-Loop Learning<\/strong><\/p>\n Argyris defines learning as \u201cthe detection and correction of error\u201d where an error is a mismatch between what was intended and what was produced. Single-loop learning is where the changes only involve changing the action strategies (at its simplest ‘try harder!’). Double-loop learning goes one step further and requires changing the values that govern theory-in use, often by questioning the status quo. The most common analogy is a thermostat [4, p.10]:<\/p>\n A thermostat is a single-loop learner. It is programmed to increase or decrease the heat in order to keep the temperature constant. A thermostat could be a double-loop learner\u00a0if it inquired into why it should measure heat and why it is set so that the temperature is constant<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Single-loop learning can be compared with becoming more efficient at what you’re already doing, whereas double-loop learning is about questioning the effectiveness of the goals. Or in other words that single-loop learning is doing things right, while double-loop learning is doing the right things.<\/p>\n Double-loop learning can happen around technical problems, while at the same time not occurring around human problems. My view is that XP practices, such as Test Driven Development (TDD), have led to double-loop learning at the technical level because there has been a change in mind-set. Prior to TDD I remember people trying single loop solutions that only involved changes in action strategies, such as \u201cjust write better quality software, and leave testing to the testers\u201d whereas now people talk more about TDD as a design tool. I do not believe that Agile approaches have led to double-loop learning in terms of human problems.<\/p>\n Model II: Overcoming organisational defensive routines<\/strong><\/p>\n Changing the defensive routines requires double-loop learning because it involves people giving up their Model I theories-in-use. Argyris describes Model II as one possible theory-in-use that can produce double-loop learning. The three governing variables of Model II are:<\/p>\n These are used together with vigilant monitoring of the effectiveness of the implemented actions.<\/p>\n It\u2019s important to note that Model II is more than just the opposite of Model I; in the same way that listening is more than just the suppression of the urge to talk. The governing variables of the opposite of Model I would be [4]:<\/p>\n Model II is not a replacement for Model I; Model I behaviour is appropriate when problems are routine or in emergency situations. The action strategies of Model II include clearly articulating a position, the difference from Model I is that there is an emphasis on enquiry and testing, similar to Bob Sutton\u2019s concept of \u201cstrong opinions, weakly held\u201d.\u00a0 Often when people realise the gaps between their espoused- and theory-in-use they want to quickly overcome this gap.\u00a0 A common experience is that after a few days of trying to learn quickly, most people relax and slow down, realising that learning to produce actions consistent with Model II will take some time. Argyris argues that \u201cmost people require as much practice to overcome skilled incompetence [by learning Model II] as to play a not-so-decent game of tennis\u201d [5].<\/p>\n Examples from Agile \/ XP<\/strong><\/p>\n In general, Agile methodologies and frameworks have taken unsophisticated approaches to organisational change, most of which fit within a Model I view of the world.<\/p>\n Scrum talks about \u201cshock therapy\u201d where \u201cteams are trained on exactly how to implement Scrum with no deviations for several sprints\u201d [6]. It uses an openly coercive approach described as \u201cforceful and mandatory way of implementing Scrum\u201d [7] in the hope that managers will receive a \u201cwake-up call\u201d and change their view of the world and their behaviours once they see the \u201chyperproductive\u201d results. The approach does not focus on organisational defensive routines, or even double loop learning at the management level. It does not ask questions like \u201cWhat was stopping us from acting this way before? Can we be sure that the thinking behind the previous approaches has really changed?\u201d Predictably, from an Argyris point of view, the authors report that management failed to change their view of the world: \u201c…management tends to disrupt hyper-productive teams \u2026 in all but one case, management \u2018killed the golden goose.\u2019\u201d.<\/p>\n XP and Agile often speak of the importance of underlying values, such as \u201ccourage\u201d. The problem with values is that they are not usually described in an actionable way. Further, the interpretation of a value depends on whether a person has a Model I or Model II mindset, or view of the world. When courage is illustrated, it is often of examples that represent a coercive approach consistent with Model I, as mentioned in an interview on \u201cWhat’s Missing from the Agile Manifesto?\u201d [8]:<\/p>\n [Courage is] \u2026 the courage to do what is best for the team, the project, even the business, despite the pressure to do otherwise. … An example [credited to Ken Schwaber] is of a scrum master who disassembled the team’s cubicles, so that they could have the team space that they wanted. When confronted by the \u2018furniture police\u2019 she made it clear that she would quit if the cubicles were restored.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This advice seems to contain several potential errors. How is a \u201ccourageous person\u201d meant to validate or test that what they believe is \u201cbest for the team\u201d is actually the best for the team? Is it OK for them to decide simply by \u201casking themselves?\u201d Do they need to make this known to others? How would this advice deal with the potential that the courageous person did not understand the wider context of their change? In the example given, the scrum master acted in a unilaterally controlling way, and when confronted blackmailed the organisation in order to get their way, entirely consistent with Model I.<\/p>\n Moving Forward: Detection and then correction of errors<\/strong><\/p>\n If Agile approaches are to have an effective impact on organisations at more than just a local team level, across longer than just the short-term, then it would be useful to spend time focussing on personal and organisational defensive mechanisms. This starts with developing an awareness of the gaps between what we espouse and how we act, so that we can at least detect errors. A useful step is to acknowledge threatening or embarrassing issues that are likely to lead to defensive Model I behaviour at the individual and group level. The next step is to work on being able to demonstrate that we have learnt by being able to produce effective behaviour, even around threatening or embarrassing issues. The challenge for the Agile community is whether we want to deal with the feelings that come from acknowledging our own blindness to our current skilled incompetence and start practicing more effective ways of acting.<\/p>\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n 1 \u2013 Argyris, C., & Sch\u00f6n, D. (1978) Organisational learning: A theory of action perspective. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.<\/p>\n 2 \u2013 Argyris, C., & Sch\u00f6n, D. (1996) Organisational learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.<\/p>\n 3 \u2013 Argyris, C. (2000) Flawed Advice and the Management Trap: How Managers Can Know When They’re Getting Good Advice and When They’re Not. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n 4 \u2013 Argyris, C. (2004), Reasons and Rationalizations. The Limits to Organizational Knowledge, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n 5 \u2013 Argyris, C (1986) Skilled incompetence. Harvard Business Review, 64(5), 74-79.<\/p>\n 6 \u2013 Sutherland, J., Downey, S. & Granvick, B. (2009) Shock Therapy: A Bootstrap for Hyper-Productive Scrum. http:\/\/jeffsutherland.com\/SutherlandShockTherapyAgile2009.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n 7 \u2013 Sutherland, J. (2008) Shock Therapy: Bootstrapping Hyperproductive Scrum. http:\/\/scrum.jeffsutherland.com\/2008\/09\/shock-therapy-bootstrapping.html <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n
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